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Governance has been one of the most popular buzzwords in recent political 
science. As with any term shared by numerous fields of research, as well as 
everyday language, governance is encumbered by a jungle of definitions and 
applications. This work elaborates on the concept of network governance. 
Network  governance  refers  to  complex  policy-making  situations,  where  a  
variety of public and private actors collaborate in order to produce and define 
policy. Governance is processes of autonomous, self-organizing networks of 
organizations exchanging information and deliberating.  
Network governance is a theoretical concept that corresponds to an 
empirical phenomenon. Often, this phenomenon is used to descirbe a 
historical development: governance is often used to describe changes in 
political processes of Western societies since the 1980s. In this work, 
empirical governance networks are used as an organizing framework, and the 
concepts of autonomy, self-organization and network structure are developed 
as tools for empirical analysis of any complex decision-making process. 
This work develops this framework and explores the governance networks 
in the case of environmental policy-making in the City of Helsinki, Finland. 
The crafting of a local ecological sustainability programme required support 
and knowledge from all sectors of administration, a number of entrepreneurs 
and  companies  and  the  inhabitants  of  Helsinki.  The  policy  process  relied  
explicitly on networking, with public and private actors collaborating to 
design policy instruments.  
Communication between individual organizations led to the development 
of network structures and patterns. This research analyses these patterns and 
their  effects  on  policy  choice,  by  applying  the  methods  of  social  network  
analysis. A variety of social network analysis methods are used to uncover 
different features of the networked process. Links between individual 
network positions, network subgroup structures and macro-level network 
patterns are compared to the types of organizations involved and final policy 
instruments chosen.  
By using governance concepts to depict a policy process, the work aims to 
assess whether they contribute to models of policy-making. The conclusion is 
that the governance literature sheds light on events that would otherwise go 
unnoticed, or whose conceptualization would remain atheoretical. The 
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In recent decades political sciencists have claimed that a new principle of 
governing societies is emerging.  Old, monolithic governments have been 
replaced by something more dynamic and flexible. Political scientists have 
been  fascinated  by  the  inclusion  of  private  actors  in  deciding  over  policy,  
developing a new terminology to explain this new way of governing (Pierre 
2000): the concept of governance.  
The  claims  of  paradigmatic  changes  in  real-life  events  and  the  reality  of  
politics have often been overestimated, and the over-enthusiastic thesis of 
governance of private actors replacing the government altogether has rightly 
been  discarded  (Davies  2002,  301-302).  Critics  have  also  pointed  to  the  
involvement of private actors in earlier regimes, raising questions on whether 
governance can really provide new insight into how policy happens. 
I claim that the development of the governance vocabulary has led to the 
development of useful tools of policy analysis. Many governance propositions 
do not rely on changes in the policy-making process – simply the inclusion of 
multiple actors,  whether private or public,  into the process.  This work aims 
to  develop  these  propositions  as  a  research  framework.  When  defined  this  
way, the theory of governance focuses on the network aspects of decision-
making.  
The aim of this work is to build a research framework of governance for 
policy analysis, based on the existing literature. The literature on governance 
as a tool of policy analysis has used a variety of overlapping concepts (van 
Kersbergen & van der Waarden 2004; Sairinen 2009), and this has led many 
to  contest  the  usefulness  of  the  concept  (Jordan  2008,  18).  Still,  there  is  a  
baseline agreement over the basic concept (Stoker 1998a, 17). The present 
work hopes to build on this agreement, based on what is implied but not 
always explicated in the literature. The developed concepts form a logical 
framework for empirical analysis, when supported by a relevant 
methodology.  
This methodology is social network analysis. Social network analysis uses 
network theory and graph theory (Brandes and Erlebach 2005) to study a set 
of ties between a set of actors – a network – and the structures and patterns 
formed  by  these  ties.  Heuristically,  policy-making  is  known  to  be  rarely  
completely hierarchical,  nor completely open,  but dependent on the various 
connections people and institutions hold. Social network analysis provides us 
with numerous ways to formalize and quantify network structures, at the 
level of the individual actor, at the level of small groups, or at the level of a 
whole network. A set of these measures can summarize what is potentially a 
very  complex  network  structure:  a  network  of  a  hundred  actors  has  9900  
connections, and trillions of possible configurations of these. The summaries 
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of  the  structure  provide  us  with  the  possibility  of  using  the  network  as  an  
explanatory variable for policy outcomes.  
The main argument of the governance literature has been that networks 
are at the heart of policy-making. Yet, empirical analyses have rarely worked 
from an  explicit  definition  of  network  and  worked  networks  into  the  actual  
explanation. Governance implies that networks should be in the explanans of 
policy phenomena. While not straight-forward, it is possible to build an 
empirical framework around this argument. The point here is that by doing 
exactly that, governance theory gets the much needed link between politics 
and networks. 
Governance is not specific to a political system, a historical era, or a policy 
field.  It  is  a  research  framework  that  can  be  applied  to  any  policy-making  
session or context and that could incorporate different competing theories or 
models (Ostrom 2005, 27-29), including hypotheses on the importance of 
public and private actors. The results are more or less relevant depending on 
the policy: in a perfect autocracy, the network of a single person does not 
provide interesting structures to analyze. But this does not mean something 
is  governance  and  something  else  is  not:  it  is  a  research  framework  that  
applies to some problems better than others.  
One of the settings where networks are particularly salient is local 
environmental governance (Bulkeley & Betsill 2003, 189). The local level has 
always been most explicit in its networked aspects, as governing regimes and 
other arrangements have involved private actors in the processes (Gibbs & 
Jonas 2000, 305-306). Local problems and knowledge to solve them are held 
at a variety of sites, and the activation of local, tacit knowledge is just as 
important as technical solutions deriving from a body of science (Ostrom 
2009). Environmental governance needs networks, as the problems happen 
at different scales than policy-making: local solutions affect global problems, 
and global solutions become local challenges. 
Thus, the empirical part of the work is a case study of environmental 
policy-making in the City of Helsinki, Finland. The data collection grew out 
of a focus on a single programme policy process – the Ecological 
Sustainability Programme – and extended to include communication 
processes  in  the  city  over  a  period  of  time  at  the  turn  and  beginning  of  the  
millennium. The case study is used to develop the governance framework. 
The case study focuses on the following research questions: 1) What 
patterns and network structures emerged from the communication process, 
and why? and 2) How did these patterns affect policy outcomes?  
This summary reflects on the development of the framework, as it 
changed slightly over time. The analyses are presented in three articles.  
Article I explores network structures in connection with policies and 
preferences  of  the  actors  involved.  Simple  descriptive  measures  of  the  
network are compared with outcomes in order to link governance theory to 




Article II further develops the network description methods and their link 
with policy substance. A combination of centrality, structural holes and 
network  subgroups  is  argued  to  be  the  core  of  the  network  properties  in  
network governance, and the structures they form are compared to policy. 
Article  III  presents  analysis  on  the  composition  of  the  network.  It  asks  
why  and  how  the  organizations  in  the  network  chose  to  communicate  with  
the partners they did, by applying the exponential random graph modelling, 
a method for simultaneous estimation of the importance of individual 
characteristics and network structures in choosing communication partners. 
This summary article discusses the background and theoretical thinking 
in  more  detail  than  was  possible  in  the  articles,  published  in  journals  with  
space constraints. The second chapter of the summary presents theory, data 
and  method.  In  Section  2.1,  I  discuss  the  theory  of  governance  and  put  
forward an argument for what I consider the core of this theory. In 2.2 I 
introduce  the  method  of  social  network  analysis,  and  link  it  to  governance.  
Section 2.3 presents the background for the case study  and 2.4 the data set. 
Chapter 3 summarizes the findings from research, followed by a discussion in 
Chapter 4. 
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2 THEORY, METHOD, AND DATA 
2.1 GOVERNANCE 
2.1.1 A NETWORK THEORY OF GOVERNANCE 
 
Governance has been one of the most popular buzzwords in the past decade 
in a variety of scientific fields (van Kersbergen & van Waarden 2004). This 
has led to considerable debate, as writers lament the lack communication 
between scientific communities using the term (Young 2005). The debate 
arises  from  the  many  uses  of  the  word.  The  critics  –  as  well  as  the  
proponents! (Jordan 2008, 23) - say there are too many definitions and uses 
for the term to justify its use, and the historical change it aims to describe has 
not  happened  anyway.  Some  contend  it  still  has  value,  if  understood  as  an  
organizing framework (Stoker 1998, 18a). 
I  take  the  concepts  that  form  the  baseline  agreement  over  what  
governance entails and apply them as an empirical research framework or 
empirical theory. Here, governance simply refers to self-organizing, inter-
organizational networks that are charged with policy-making (Rhodes 1996, 
660; Stoker 1998a, 18).  Any setting with a plurality of actors and no formal 
control system that can dictate the relationships between the actors 
(Chhotray & Stoker 2009, 3) is a governance network. Policy-making 
involves multiple organizations, from the government as well as from the 
outside. The policy issues are complex, and even defining the policy problem 
is demanding (Stoker 2000, 92).  
They may be classified as wicked problems: no definite problem, no rule 
for knowing if the problem is solved, unique characteristics (van Bueren et al. 
2003, 193-194). Setting policy goals, defining solutions, and implementation 
all require resources that are not held by any single organization, resulting in 
interdependence of the organizations. The interdependence in turn provides 
the organizations in the network considerable autonomy from central 
control. 
The  many  strands  of  governance  literature  are  diverse  in  their  focus  on  
either the political system (“Westminster model” vs. “differentiated polity”, 
Flinders  2002,  51-52)  or  the  policies  produced  by  the  system (Jordan  et  al.  
2005),  as  well  as  their  approach  to  explanation  in  the  social  sciences  (Tilly  
2001,  22-25).  In  the  next  sections  I  try  to  justify  this  reading  of  the  
governance literature and clarify it. I will discuss the debate on governance 





Section  2.1.3  focuses  on  governance  issues  specific  to  the  local  level  and  
the  environmental  field,  while  2.1.4  discusses  some  requirements  for  the  
governance theory, model, and method. Finally, 2.1.5 presents my framework 
for governance research. 
2.1.2 THE DEBATE ON THE THEORY OF GOVERNANCE  
 
Even with the simple definition of governance above, the concept of 
governance brings up a variety of debates and controversies in using the 
term. I treat governance as a framework that identifies the universal 
elements that one needs consider in analysis (Ostrom 2005, 28). This 
framework can be developed into more specific theories, and further into 
model that can be applied to empirical data. As with any scientific model, the 
governance model discards some of the real world information and hopes to 
retain the important bits to find the mechanisms behind the observed 
processes.  
The  governance  argument  is  that  if  we  have  data  on  the  interactions  of  
organizations, we can overlook other evidence for the moment. I do not argue 
that there are no case-specific features varying by policy and by jurisdiction. I 
argue that there are similar governance processes in policy-making across 
horizontal and vertical levels, and these general properties can be teased out 
of data. Sometimes, personal connections are central; sometimes, media 
attention  might  be  the  driving  force  –  but  in  general,  we  can  observe  a  
network of organizations, and see how that produces policy. 
The framework does not provide estimates on whether something is 
governance or not. It provides a model of the dynamic policy process. The 
assessment of the model is an assessment of the plausibility of the arguments 
– whether the governance model gives a good description of the events. 
The  structure  of  this  chapter  is  shaped  by  debate:  I  will  discuss  
governance  as  theory  by  reference  to  its  various  criticisms.  It  is  a  rather  
round-about way of  defining theory.  But using the concepts of  network and 
governance, a straightforward definition results in confusion, as the political 
science community is still divided over the term and its prospects. The use of 
the most fashionable term does not make the researcher’s task any easier. 
This  discussion  will  hopefully  allow  me  justify  the  building  blocks  for  my  
theory of governance in the net sections. 
I  will  challenge  three  criticisms  that  the  governance  literature  has  often  
faced.  First,  I  will  discuss  the  popularity  of  the  term.  Some  cross-
disciplinarity  will  and  should  remain  with  the  concept,  but  I  argue  that  an  
upfront political science base will debar some of the alternative connotations 
the term has in other sciences, including business economics, as well as 
society at large, like World Bank’s uses of the term. Second, I will discuss the 
level of historical change required by a governance framework to function, 
along with the built-in assumptions of different actor’s relative status in the 
Theory, Method, and Data 
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process. My argument is that if we start with no assumptions, we can have 
both historical eras and the governance versus government discussion as 
empirical questions. Third, in building up to the next section, I will discuss 
whether the two first criticisms foreclose discussion of governance as a 
proper  theory.  Some  have  deemed  governance  to  be  too  general  and  too  
reliant on unmanifest change, but still interesting enough to be applied with 
a qualifying attribute. I discuss the relation of my governance definition to 
some of these.  
The popularity of the concept of governance in recent years has been 
almost overwhelming, and there have been calls to both discount the concept 
altogether,  as  well  as  support  for  embracing  the  cross-disciplinarity.  The  
term has been used in a range of sciences from business economics (Monks & 
Minow 2008) to international relations (Rosenau 2000). This leads to the 
first point of criticism for governance: the concept is used in too many 
related but different fields, and while it might have a future as a bridge 
between  the  disciplines,  the  theoretical  diversity  is  too  great  for  much  else  
(van Kersbergen & van Waarden 2004, 144). This problem does exist in the 
current literature, but it should be more a problem of communication than a 
problem  of  the  theory.  The  inclusion  of  practices  in  the  management  of  a  
firm in the lists of types of governance (Hirst 2000, 17; van Kersbergen & van 
Waarden 2004, 147) is an example: admittedly, it is called governance, but 
common-sense reading should easily find a difference between corporate 
governance and policy-making. Related concepts in related disciplines will 
always have some overlap, and some differences. Any term or concept in the 
social sciences, especially if the term also has a meaning in common everyday 
language, is riddled with multiple definitions.  
Different concepts are often the source of confusion within the 
governance literature, as well as between the literature and it's most vocal 
critics.  With  a  few  clarifications,  much  of  this  confusion  is  cleared.  The  
governance framework has no normative preconditions, is not concerned 
with exogenous accountability, and focuses on the process of decision-
making. The simple governance-as-networks definition places no normative 
conditions on governance. Discussions of good governance, for example, are 
beyond the scope of this governance framework. The governance framework 
does not focus on external accountability – shareholders outside the firm, but 
also democracy and network accountability by voters. Obviously, these issues 
are linked, but they are not included in the framework. Process-orientation 
means that assumptions are made on what to observe, not on what outcomes 
to  expect.  I  deliberately  leave  out  discussions  on  governance  in  law,  
international relations and outside the academic literatures. My discussion 
here concerns the literature on governance in public policy, public 
administration, and political science.  
This choice goes against the suggestion by van Kersbergen and van 
Waarden  (2004,  165)  and  Chhotray  and  Stoker  (2009)  to  look  at  how  the  
term is applied in related sciences. Van Kersbergen and van Waarden call for 
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multidisciplinarity to establish a theoretical and practical link to democracy. 
The discussions on legitimacy and accountability are important, but beyond 
the scope of the theory of governance per se. The aim here is to summarise 
the governance argument in the simplest form, so as to enable its use for 
empirical research.While recognizing that descriptions of reality do have a 
normative  basis,  in  the  choices  on  what  to  describe  and  how,  there  should  
still be room for empirical frameworks. 
 The problem with analysing legitimacy through the theory of governance 
becomes apparent when we discuss the historical changes attributed to 
governance theory that should be at most empirical results of research based 
on the theory; in short, the governance framework does not presuppose a 
power structure. While accountability in networks can be problematic, it can 
vary depending on the context: at the local level, governance has even been 
seen to improve participation in democracy (e.g. Kearns 1999).  
Thus, the myriad ways in which the term is used outside political science 
should  not  confuse  an  observant  reader,  but  an  important  source  of  
confusion does remain: whether governance denotes a label for a historical 
era  with  an  accompanying  sea  change  in  the  role  of  the  state  or  the  
government. This second criticism of governance relates to the relative 
importance of different actors in the governance processes. Governance has 
been used to refer to the changing role of the state, for example during new 
public management reforms 1980s (Bevir et al, 2003, 13): governance is the 
grand story line of the marginalized state (Hysing 2009, 647). The critics 
have accused these writers of overestimating the importance of private actors 
in  policy-making  (Jordan  et  al.,  2005,  478),  and  that  the  move  from  
government to governance has not been as marked as the theorists claim 
(Marinetto 2003, 605). The governance theorists have not done themselves 
any  favours  by  the  most  enthusiastic  claims  –  famously  captured  in  the  
phrase “governing without government” in two of the most cited1 governance 
texts (Rhodes 1996; 1997).  
The extent of the debate over the importance of the state is still 
surprising, as it is acknowledged that governance does not make any 
prejudgements about the locus of power (Pierre 2000a, 3), and the ability of 
the state to steer the networks, at least as an active participant, is not 
disputed (Rhodes 1996, 660).  
These debates conceptualize governance and government as exogenous 
institutions, not explained or defined in network terms but as states of 
society or historical eras. So far, historical governance approaches have not 
been  very  successful  at  explanation  or  empirical  applications  to  policy  
(Jordan  et  al.  2005,  477).  Without  reference  to  social  mechanisms,  the  
argument for a movement from a command-and-control state to enabling 
state  (Peters  &  Pierre  2001,  131)  does  not  provide  us  with  any  tools  for  
understanding this change. 
                                               
1 Both works have been cited more than 1000 times, according to Google Scholar.  
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Still, virtually every governance article or book opens with a reference to 
historical changes happening during the two last decades of the 20th century 
and beyond. At least two different approaches to the historical move to 
governance have been used. The radical approach posits governance as a 
fundamental change in the way societies are governed, and governance is 
seen as a whole new era in governing. A new model of government is 
supposed to have emerged (Pierre & Peters 2000, 3). The forms, 
mechanisms, locations, capacities, and styles of governing have changed (van 
Kersbergen & van Waarden 2004, 143). The traditional split into public and 
private institutions has ceased to be clear (Hirst 2000, 20). Occasionally, it is 
the debate itself that is new (Rhodes 1996, 653).  
Others argue that the changes in the capacity of the state have been less 
spectacular  (Jordan  et  al.  2005,  494).  The  state  is  still  the  centre  of  
considerable political power (Pierre & Peters 2000, 12). These competing 
views  –  the  society-centric  one  and  the  state-centric  one  –  both  look  at  
governance  as  a  phenomenon  (Pierre  &  Peters  2000,  24).  This  leads  to  a  
fairly muddled discussion on whether something that happened was 
governance or not, ongoing without a shared definition of governance, which 
has led to much confusion surrounding governance. For example, the same 
author might agree that governance does not prejudge who has power (Pierre 
2000a, 3), but still decide to use “a state-centric approach” (Pierre & Peters 
2000, 12). 
The concept of meta-governance (Whitehead 2003) is another perspective 
to argue for the stable importance of government in governing. Meta-
governance is when what is seemingly governance – networks, for example – 
is managed by governments. Metagovernance attempts to highlight 
negotiated links between government and governance. Private actors act in 
networks of governance, while governmental bodies do the same at a meta-
level. Metagovernance is the acts of governments above the network – setting 
conditions  for  the  network  process  (Nyholm  &  Haveri  2009,  120).  As  the  
government still holds formal authority, there is an element of 
metagoverance  in  any  governance  process.  But  postulating  the  acts  of  
government in networks as metagovernance overlooks the fact that 
governments are just as interdependent as other actors, if not more so: they 
need to produce solutions to policy problems, but do not possess the 
information necessary to do so. Private actors have the veto, too, due to this 
interdependency, and can use it to do metagovernance – and this is why I do 
not see the utility of the prefix. 
Less radically, governance can be a slight alteration of changes toward the 
private sector. This view on the historical change – especially in 
environmental governance –  focuses on the type of policy instrument chosen 
(Jordan  et  al.  2005;  Jordan  et  al.  2003;  Sairinen  2009,  140-143;  Pierre  
2000b, 242-243). The reasoning stems from the proposition that governance 
focuses on governance mechanisms that do not need state authority or state 
sanctions (Stoker 1998a, 17). Here, governance is the more widespread 
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linkages  between  the  private  sector  and  the  government,  in  the  form  of  
official public-private -partnerships or public service outsourcing. 
The problem with these approaches is that they equate policy instrument 
with governance mechanism, and then assume private actors will uniformly 
prefer policy instruments that appear to leave more leeway to private actors, 
including self-regulation and voluntary agreements (Sairinen 2009, 140). 
First, while there is an abundance of new terminology used by governments, 
it does not necessarily mean the private actors are more involved or powerful 
in the decision-making processes. If the move is from earlier hierarchical 
corporatist representation with powerful trade unions to more diverse sets of 
actors (Hirst 2000, 19), the state may have even more control, as with closely 
steered public-private partnerships (Marinetto 2003, 601).  Second, the 
assumption of private actors choosing policy instruments that appear more 
private can be questioned. Public-private partnering will open more 
possibilities for rent-seeking, with private actors using the government to 
introduce artificial scarcity (Boyne 1998, 700-701). Private participation may 
lead to a variety of policy instruments, and the new environmental policy 
instruments can not be taken as a necessary feature of new governance 
arrangements in general. The preference of private actors has to be justified 
for each case.  
I remain agnostic on the level of historical change from government to 
governance, and argue that a governance process could produce any type of 
policy outcomes. This is in contrast to Pierre and Peters (2000, 24), who 
argue that the dual meaning of governance as both framework and 
phenomenon is intrinsic. To me, the definition of governance as an empirical 
framework should be suitable for the analysis of any type of governing 
structure. Admittedly, how interesting the governance analysis is will depend 
on the context (ibid. 24).  
 When the criticisms of generality and overestimating change are 
combined, the status of governance as more than a buzzword is questioned. 
The  third  criticism  of  the  theory  of  governance  has  been  that  it  does  not  
constitute a theory – or even the seeds of a theory (van Kersbergen and van 
Waarden 2004, 144). The conceptualization of governance is deemed too 
confusing (Pierre 2000a, 3). This is even acknowledged in the seminal 
governance paper of Rhodes (1996), as well as by others who have attempted 
to build a theory out of governance (Stoker 1998a, 17; Kooiman 2003, 5).  
The requirements for theory are not often explicitly discussed, but I do 
agree  with  the  authors  that  the  eclectic  and  disjointed  literature  on  
governance (Jessop 1995) does not provide a coherent, systematic paradigm. 
To  respond  to  this,  a  discussion  what  a  coherent  theory  would  require  is  
needed.  I  will  take  up  more  details  on  fundamental  requirerements  for  a  
theory or a model in section 2.1.4, and discuss some attempts that have tried 
to elevate governance to the status of theory here. 
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Some attempts at a comprehensive theory based on dynamics of policy 
processes do exist. These approaches take an explicitly normative or 
managerial position. Governance, qualified by a positive attribute such as 
collaborative or participatory, is the ideal way of governing. They point to the 
noted deficit of correspondence between democracy inputs through voting 
and  outputs  of  policy  (Peters  2000,  37),  and  set  out  to  build  models  of  
governance that improve this connection.  
These normative governance theories operate on a different definition of 
theory than the analytical governance framework being built here, while 
bringing  the  normative  and  the  managerial  to  the  forefront.  Some  of  these  
theories are just utopian views of participatory politics (Chhotray & Stoker 
2009, 241). Others bring forth more interesting aspects of modern 
participation and few comments on these theories helps me in the definition 
of my framework, as the core of the theory is often very similar. Sairinen 
(2009) lists three types of uses, with specific focus on environmental 
governance, that fall into this category. These are reflexive governance, 
deliberative governance and adaptive governance. Especially in 
environmental  policy,  such  governance  approaches  are  common,  as  the  
failings of traditional policy making methods are most evident in 
environmental problems.  
Reflexive governance focuses on governance processes, dividing 
reflexivity into two different phases (Sairinen 2009, 145-146). First-order 
reflexivity is the historical change in how to govern, as in the governance 
literature, but drawing on Ulrich Beck’s (1994) reflexive modernization 
writing. Second-order reflexivity refers to the self-referential, anticipatory 
processes (Sairinen 2009, 146). As this points to the integration of 
knowledge and even networks, it is of the same type of governance as 
discussed here. But it also refers to a system of technological artefacts, 
organizations, theories, institutions (Voss & Kemp 2006, 10) and all manner 
of objects that contribute to the state of the real world. Indeed, reflexive 
governance is a concept linking together many discourses, practices and 
concepts  to  reach  a  shared  goal  (ibid.,20).  This  objective  is  very  different  
from the one here. The richness of objects and events in the real world is seen 
in the inputs and outputs of the governance system, but the question I pose is 
different:  if  we  drop  them from the  equation,  look  at  the  networks,  can  we  
come up with plausible explanation for policy-making? 
Deliberative governance is explicitly about opening up the participatory 
processes of democracy, and the importance of language and interpretation 
in policy-making (Hajer & Wagenaar 2003, 14). Again, the core theme of 
governance is the same: deliberative governance refers to new places where 
politics are made under conditions of radical uncertainty and 
interdependence. Also, the theory does not necessarily need to commit to a 
normative position on governance (Wagenaar & Cook 2003). The difference 
lies in the approach to the argumentative turn: deliberative policy analysis is 
about interpreting the linguistic representations, where meaning is a product 
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of human communities (Hajer & Wagenaar 2003, 17). Communally shared 
meaning is a complicated concept to integrate with autonomous networks. 
Adaptive  governance  (Dietz  et  al.  2003;  Folke  et  al.  2005;  Hukkinen  
2008) comes closest to the governance meaning here: 
“Adaptive governance systems often self-organize with teams and 
actor  groups  that  draw  on  various  knowledge  systems  and  
experiences  for  the  development  of  common  understanding  and  
policies”  
Folke et al. 2005, 441  
I have argued elsewhere (Toikka 2009) that the social governance system can 
be  analyzed  as  a  complex  adaptive  system,  with  the  ecological  as  the  
governance system environment. The governance framework should 
probably be treated as a subsystem of social-ecological systems (Ostrom 
2009, 420), and social networks are indeed one part of adaptive 
management  systems  for  common  pool  resources  (Folke  et  al.  2005,  458).  
The  governance  framework  here  could  then  be  part  of  a  socio-ecological  
systems analysis. 
2.1.3 LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 
 
Local environmental governance has been a particular focus of research, with 
various properties of the local attracting interest. Decision-making at the 
local  level  has  been  seen  to  have  specific  features  –  and  local  has  been  
identified as a key site for environmental policy. These features reflect on the 
central concepts of networks and governance, but again some clarifications 
on what these concepts refer to are needed.  
Environmental policy-making happens at a variety of scales, with 
overlapping and competing authorities through the process of glocalization 
(Bulkeley 2005). Global environmental problems are often translated into 
policy at the local scale. This leads to a boundary definition problem, where 
the relevant set of rules or actors is hard to define. The traditional spatial 
limits of regulation do not correspond to the policy problems. But there still 
are policy processes that happen at or at least around a regulative scale. 
Focusing on processes between actors instead of sets of actors or specific 
policies should allow for the overlap between scales to be included in the 
research. 
The research tradition of urban regimes has much in common with 
governance tradition, and it has been suggested as a useful approach to local 
environmental policy making research (Gibbs & Jones 2000, 310). Indeed, 
an urban regime is “the informal arrangements by which public bodies and 
private interest function together to be able to make and carry out governing 
decisions”  (Stone  1989,  6).  Regimes  are  governance  networks  –  but  of  a  
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particular type: when a governing coalition becomes dominant or hegemonic, 
it becomes a regime.  
Governance by regime is associated with stability over time. Longitudinal 
governance studies would be necessary to assess the exact relationship 
between these two research traditions, but in environmental governance 
there are some reasons the steer away from regime concepts until further 
evidence emerges. The more fluid and dynamic terminology available from 
governance has a better connection to issues of local environment. Urban 
regimes are often associated with economic development and even business 
interests,  and  using  governance  sidesteps  this  connotation.  However,  I  will  
point  out  some  results  from  the  case  study  that  would  be  interesting  to  
analyse as sectoral environmental regimes. 
Local  governing  has  long  had  collaboration  of  public  and  private  bodies  
through partnership arrangements (Stoker 1998b, 34) and other means. This 
has led to a tendency to consider local governance through titular networks: 
for example, one Finnish municipality has “some 40 networks […] like joint 
authorities” (Haveri et al. 2009, 546). This runs contrary to what I mean by 
networks: the totality of communication links between any number partners. 
The 40 networks would be parts of the local governance network, and 
network managing or metagovernance is just participating in those networks 
– the municipality has no control over potential collaborations between two 
companies in different networks, for example.  
Even when the networks are not such nominal networks, some authors 
have argued that there should be separate networks for broad coalitions 
based on goals (Daugbjerg & Pedersen 2004, 202). The aim is to combine the 
open network definition, where participants may or may not collaborate with 
each other, with a definition giving the network itself actor status, as an 
“environmental policy network”, implying environmentalist goals. This is 
another governance property that should remain open until the empirical 
analysis is in: we need to have a single network, and if we find that there is 
conflict and absence of collaboration and trust between two groups in the 
network (polluters and environmentalist, for example), that is a very 
interesting  result.  If  we  start  by  conceiving  two  separate  networks,  it  is  not  
possible to argue neither for nor against the separation of the groups in the 
network. 
2.1.4 METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM AND GOVERNANCE 
 
In this section, I continue the elaboration of the governance framework with 
a different level: the types of issues that have to be articulated by a theory. 
Theory  needs  to  define  what  elements  are  relevant  for  a  certain  kind  of  
question  and  make  some  working  assumptions  about  these  elements  
(Ostrom 2005, 30). I build on two such assumptions: the analysis should 
proceed  by  elaborating  governance  through  social  mechanisms,  while  
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subscribing to the principle of methodological individualism – by building 
descriptions of the dynamics of individual interactions that produce the 
observed macro-level phenomena.  
These epistemological or even ontological commitments are made for 
practical or heuristic reasons: the link to the methodology of social network 
analysis  only  exists  through  the  definition  of  structure  as  regularities  or  
patterns in interactions (Wasserman & Faust 1994, 6-7) of individuals, not as 
properties of an independent collective. This will help to clarify the difference 
between governance networks and other network concepts, such as the 
network  society  or  the  networks  of  actants  in  actor-network  theory  (Newig  
2010). 
Methodological individualism, as used here, claims that all social 
explanations could, in principle, be explained in terms of individuals and 
their  interactions  (Udehn  2002,  479).  The  fundamental  actor  is  the  
individual person (Hedström & Swedberg 1998, 11). Structural and group 
properties  do  exist,  but  they  do  not  act.  The  origin  of  diverse  institutions,  
such as the family, the state or money, can be explained by reference to series 
of actions of individuals and hence endogenized into the model.  
Methodological individualism does not mean reverting to an atomistic 
view of man-islands, acting without reference to others: 
“Nobody ventures to deny that nations, states, municipalities, parties, 
religious communities, are real factors determining the course of 
human events. Methodological individualism, far from contesting the 
significance of such collective wholes, considers it as one of its main 
tasks  to  describe  and  to  analyze  their  becoming  and  their  
disappearing, their changing structures, and their operation. And it 
chooses the only method fitted to solve this problem satisfactorily”  
Mises 1949, 42  
Thus, a methodological individualist explanation is entirely capable of 
including norms and institutions (Mizruchi 1994, 339). Structures are viewed 
as enablers and constraints – as structural suggestions (Dowding 2001, 97), 
forcing actors to recalculate their actions.  
A social mechanism is an analytical construct that provides a hypothetical 
link between observable events, with reference to the actor, but the structural 
constraints as well. A mechanism specifies a model: an abstract 
representation of the logic of the process that could have produced the 
observed  link  between  events  (Hernes  1998,  78).   A  definition  of  the  
mechanism includes the actors, the structure they are constrained by, and 
the logical dynamic of the process (ibid., 92-93). As in any modelling 
enterprise, we are discarding most of the observations, and making 
generalizing assumptions, and aiming to find some generic mechanisms.  
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The current governance literature does not properly explain the 
mechanisms of governance networks (for an elegant critique of this 
disconnect, see Christopoulos 2008). The organizational structure of the 
network does not directly act, and the proposition of networks making 
decisions is a black-box explanation. A more successful explanatory model 
must be able to convey how the initial policy problem results in a policy 
outcome through actual actions.  
For the governance mechanisms, we need to build a model of the actor: 
the purposes of their acting, as well as their resources to act. Any social 
phenomena can in principle be explained by reference to individuals, but the 
generative chains of complex phenomena are near infinite in length. The 
weak version of methodological individualism admits that in practice, we do 
not need to unravel everything in order to go back to the level of individuals 
(Hedström & Swedberg 1998, 12). Observable collective agents may be 
permitted to act, admitting that they themselves are the results of different 
individual-level mechanisms. Here, we let organizations act, and prescribe 
characteristics to them that better apply to persons, including preferences.  
We need to use the qualities of the actors to model structure, or the 
structural  constraints  the  actors  face.  The  mechanism is  the  play  of  putting  
the  set  of  actors  with  observed  and  assumed properties  on  the  stage  of  the  
structure,  and  inferring  the  resulting  outcome.  The  main  assumption  made  
here  is  that  the  organizations  involved  are  purposeful  actors,  with  no  
predefined preference or role applied to any particular actor. There is no 
aggregate “state” outside the network of organizations – a variety of public 
organizations acts in the network, similarly to any other organization. 
Whether they end up with different network positions or more satisfaction 
with outcomes is an empirical question. 
The discussion on actors highlights the importance of methodological 
individualism for the study here. There is no way to observe how a 
governance network results in a different policy choice without reference to 
the individuals acting in the network. If the government is given a different 
role in the process than others,  a  priori,  there is  no way to observe them as 
participants in the networking process. This answers to the criticisms aimed 
towards the policy networks tradition, where challengers claimed that 
networks do not explain anything (cf. Howlett 2002, 236), and explains the 
frustrations of governance critics, when they try to explain real events in 
broad-brush  dichotomies  such  as  state  versus  civil  society  or  public  versus  
private (Boettke 2005, 131).  Networks only explain via their power to 
constrain and enable the actions of individuals.  
Paying attention to explanations at the micro- and macro-levels clarifies 
this.  The  main  issue  with  both  the  strictly  descriptive  and  the  more  
theoretical approaches is their inadequacy in explanation due to explaining 
the collective by the collective. They are interested in explaining at the 
macro-level, on the level of society. In governance research, this might mean 
taking  the  macro-status  of  the  system  (governance  or  government,  for  
 
21 
example), and the macro-result (the type of policy produced) and looking at 
the correlations between them (basically what is done in Jordan et al. 2005).  
But governance theory does not say anything about the type of policy 
produced, only about the processes where they are produced. The key quote 
is  from Peters (2000, 43):  “if  networks are everything,  then maybe they are 
nothing”. Networks are indeed everything in the argument of governance, 
and the definition of governance network is sufficiently general to include 
any type of societal organization. This is, however, a feature, not a bug: it 
allows us to find define the governance mechanism in generic terms to allow 
the comparative research Peters himself calls for (ibid. 50).  
The focus on individuals holds even though we are fundamentally 
interested in how the state of the collective situation affects the collective 
outcome. “Collective decisions are, rather obviously, taken by a collection of 
individuals” (Chhotray & Stoker 2008, 4). The macro-level is, by definition, 
an ensemble of its constitutive parts, and explanation should account for the 
processes at the level of the parts (Coleman 1990, 3-5). The attempt here is to 
take the governance building blocks and improve the connection to real-
world events via methodological individualism and mechanism-based 
explanation.  
Thus, the framework of governance does not aim to be a grand theory of 
society, but a Mertonian middle-range theory (Merton 1968): a theory that 
aims to consolidate otherwise segregated hypotheses and empirical 
regularities.  The middle ground aimed for is between grand theories, where 
one or few features are postulated as essential features of society (Boudon 
1991) and simple empiricism. A middle-range theory accepts complexity, but 
aims to simplify by finding patterns and regularities and accompanying them 
with plausible accounts of human action could produce those (Geels 2007). 
2.1.5 MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 
 
I have argued for a mechanism-based governance model, where collaboration 
of organizations is empirically observed without roles or positions assigned a 
priori.  The  empirical  governance  account  takes  the  networks,  looks  at  the  
processes  in  which  they  are  formed,  and  then  at  how  the  network  
collaborates to make policy. The theory will help us understand policy 
outcomes. The model does not suggest any particular policy outcome, but 
should be able to produce any outcomes, given suitable governance 
arrangements. The macro-micro-macro -structure for governance is in 
Figure 1.  
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Figure 1.  The macro-micro linkage for governance 
 
At  the  macro  level,  there  is  a  policy  issue  that  requires  a  policy  response.  
Governance posits that the policy is made via networks that are, in turn, 
results from individual level interactions. Governance is further broken into 
two separate stages of the process (Udehn 2001, 301), the first one explaining 
why and how the governance networks establish themselves through the 
actions of  individual  organizations,  and the second how the networks make 
policy.  Conceptually, network building and network policy decisions are 
separated in the model. This does not imply that the real-life events can be 
separated into stages of policy-making, as in the classic policy process models 
or “stage heuristics” (Sabatier 1999, 6). It is a conceptual distinction, made 
for the sake of enabling analysis. 
This two-phased process is in Figure 2.  There are six steps, each governed 
by  a  social  mechanism.  The  governance  process  starts  at  a  policy  need  or  a  
problem  to  be  addressed.  This  initial  agenda  can  be  the  result  of  the  
governance process itself, but is also heavily influenced by media attention 
(Walgrave & Van Aelst 2006) and other factors, including popular discourse 
or the prevalent zeitgeist (Mudde 2004). Agenda-setting also requires some 
traditional government influence, as policies will still require the government 
to  guard  and  sanction  it.  But  even  an  active  government  is  not  in  complete  
control of its creations (Newman & Thornley 1997, 985). The agenda gets 
refined and defined in the network, and policies may diverge significantly 
from the initial setting. 
The policy need leads the actors to initiate the process of network 
building:  one  actor  realizes  it  lacks  some  resource  to  respond  to  the  
challenge, and goes to another for help. This triggers others to act. But the 
acts are not independent: maintaining connections is easier than establishing 
new ones, and information on potential new partners is gathered via existing 
network  contacts.  In  sum,  a  complex  structure  of  interactions  and  
communication arises, often stabilizing into a temporary equilibrium, or at 




Then, the second phase of the process takes the network and derives the 
policy from there. The network enables the organizational actors to involve 
their communication partners in planning the policy, to draw on their 
expertise  as  well  as  influence  them.  The  final  policy  is  produced  in  this  
communication process between actors. The communication process consists 
of many different types of flows, as information exchange, attitude 
influencing and giving support are different network acts (Borgatti 2005).  
In this work, I focus on communication, with the connotation of dialogue, 
as the driver of the governance network.  Modern policy problems feature 
cognitive due technical issues and unclear causative links, strategic 
uncertainty due to the number of actors involved, and institutional 
uncertainty from the many places and arenas where decisions are made (van 
Bueren et al. 2003, 193-194). Simple broadcast or just passing your 
information  on  to  everyone  is  not  effective.  Informing  others  of  your  
preference and resource exchange are at background when organizations 
engage in policy design of collaborative nature. Governance networks are 
networks of dialogue and reflection (Jessop 2003, 102).  
 
 
Figure 2. The macro-micro linkage elaborated in two phases 
 
The micro-macro –connection reveals the relationship between governance 
and systems theory (Kooiman 2000, 140). The connections between the 
micro- and macro-levels also demonstrate the link between governance 
theory and the concepts of complexity and emergence (e.g. Jalonen 2007, 
127-129; Toikka 2009).  
In the framework of Kooiman (2000, 154; 2003), governing interactions 
are distinguished in two different phases, where first-order governance aims 
to solve particular problems directly, while second-order governance builds 
the conditions that enable the problem-solving process. In the macro-micro-
macro –framework the second-order governance corresponds to the first 
phase of network building, first-order to the second phase of decision-
making.  In  the  first  phase,  the  actors  build  the  governance  structure;  these  
are the ‘games about rules’ (Stoker 1998a, 22), not games under rules. 
The framework largely overlooks two central concepts in political science, 
power and institutions, and this will need a justification. In political games 
under rules, power is well-defined and important. This is one of the 
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differences between governance and many political science frameworks. For 
a governance analyst, power is ill-defined, and less interesting. Traditionally, 
political  science  has  put  an  extensive  focus  on  power,  going  as  far  equating  
politics  with  power  (Dowding  1996),  and  this  includes  the  earlier  network  
approaches (Knoke 1996, 189-191).  
The  traditional  political  science  view  on  power  is  that  power  is  a  pre-
existing quantitative stock of influence that can be spent to influence others 
(McGuirk 2000, 653). When the problem space is defined, power is a simple 
cake-cutting  measure  with  a  constant  sum.  But  in  governance,  problem-
definition is part of the process – the size of the cake, along with the fillings 
and frostings need to be decided, from an unknown set of options. Thus, the 
governance framework takes a more evolutive take on power. 
This has both empirical and conceptual justifications. Empirically, power 
has  to  be  over  something  to  be  measured,  and  we  cannot  measure  
correlations of undefined policy preferences with similarly undefined policy 
outcome possibilities. Conceptually, this would not be very interesting 
anyway, as governance is about defining the problem-solution system 
(Kooiman 2000, 156). In complex adaptive systems, a detailed knowledge of 
the  parts  is  not  sought  after,  but  the  dynamics  of  the  whole  system are  the  
focal  point  (Folke  et  al.  2003,  445).  Power  is  an  individual-level  
characteristic, and the systems approach is interested in it insofar as it 
translates into the interactive process. Integration of knowledge is crucial: 
power is not absent, but without collaboration the power to act does not even 
exist (Stoker 2000, 92). This does not imply that power is not important, or 
that policy-making has become a cosy, open process where everybody gets 
together to figure out solutions to common problems. Politics is still about 
who get what, when and how (Lasswell 1935), when backed by the option of 
legitimate use of violence. Power is just not at the centre of a governance 
analysis. 
Another concept that is mostly disregarded is that of institutions. 
Institutions are the procedures, rules, routines, and conventions defining 
policy-making  that  might  be  embedded  in  the  formal  organizations  (Hall  &  
Taylor 1996, 938). In the governance literature, institutions have 
occasionally been defined to include the networks themselves (Rhodes 2000, 
73).  These  emergent  network  structures  are  obviously  included  at  the  very  
centre  of  network  governance  analysis,  but  the  stricter  definition  of  
institutions as the rules and norms that delimit the actions of individuals 
puts governance at odds with institutionalism. The rules and practices that 
define policy-making are generated in the networks as part of the game, and 
while  these  rules  do  function  as  limiting  factors  for  the  actors  in  networks,  
they are not permanent or even stable. Governance looks at individuals 
changing institutions as the challenges they were built to help with change; 




The empirical analysis in this study deals with policy-making in a city, but 
the references to the urban sphere in the theoretical setting have been scarce. 
The  framework  built  here  aims  to  be  generic  enough  to  be  applicable  to  
multiple settings of policy-making. Arguably, there may be some interesting 
differences in decision-making between cities and nation states. However, as 
the fields of general political science and urban politics have always mirrored 
each other in theoretical  traditions (Stoker 2000, 91),  this  should not be an 
issue.  
2.2   SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
 
In  this  chapter,  I  will  give  a  short  introduction  to  the  methods  of  social  
network analysis (for a thorough presentation, see Wasserman & Faust 1994; 
for  a  brief  introduction,  see  Wikipedia).  Social  network  analysis  is  an  
umbrella of related methods, defined by their focus on network structures 
and, more precisely, the type and form of data analysed. The data consist of 
nodes  and  ties.  The  nodes  are  the  actors  –  usually  individuals  or  
organizations, but also internet pages or academic citations. A tie is a relation 
between a pair of nodes. A network is the measurement of a tie between all 
possible pairs of nodes in the network. 
The social network methods take this set of nodes and ties between them, 
and map and analyse the structures of the network and the positions of the 
actors in it. Actors are interdependent, so they have to draw upon others for 
resources, which might be material or non-material. These individual actions 
of connecting develop into lasting patterns, often an established yet 
continuously changing structure. This structure is the network that is 
studied.  The  set  of  ties  can  provide  opportunities  or  set  constraints  for  the  
individuals, but the network is the basis of these individual effects. 
(Wasserman & Faust 1994, 4.) From these basic assumptions and simple 
data, a number of descriptive and inferential methods have been developed. 
The methods are usually numerical, but often not statistical, as the 
independence assumption made in statistical analyses is invalidated by the 
very idea of networks.  
Social network analysis differs from the conventional social science 
paradigms of survey analysis and qualitative research methods by the nature 
of the data. Statistical analysis in the social sciences is usually assumed to 
concern samples out of large populations, with data collected by survey.  This 
data treats individuals as the units of analysis and the variables are 
properties of the units. Most statistical methods have been developed with a 
built-in independence assumption, violated by the nature of the network 
data. (Scott 2000, 3-4). 
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Qualitative methods are interpretive practices making the world visible – 
making sense and interpreting various materials (Denzin & Lincoln 2005, 3-
4).  This interpretation is done with a thick description of a variety of detailed 
material – often extensive bodies of text. Qualitative research emphasises 
qualities of entities and meanings (Denzin & Lincoln 2005, 10). Social 
network analysis focuses on a simple definition of a tie, and tries to find and 
present, maybe even draw inferences, based on similarities. While studying 
the  meanings  given  to  the  network  ties  by  the  individuals  involved  can  be  
interesting, it is not social network analysis in the sense used here. 
The analysis of the network data can be done at the level of individual 
actors,  dyads  or  pairs  of  actors,  triads  of  actors,  or  the  whole  network.  The  
individual analyses concern the structural or positional properties. For 
example, network centrality or prestige is used to compare different actor 
positions.  Also,  the  study  of  subgroup  membership  structures  should  be  
considered an individual actor analysis. Cliques are not always obvious or 
explicit, and network analysis can be used to find and analyse the subgroup 
structures that might have implications on network efficiency and individual 
influence. Dyadic or triadic analyses can shed light on tendencies to 
reciprocate ties in different settings, or tendencies to maintain transitive 
network structures.  
Another persistent feature of network analysis is the use of visualizations. 
As graph theory underlies social network analysis, the use of graph drawings 
is natural. A graph drawing is, at the simplest, a representation of the nodes-
and-ties -data. At a more complex level, network graphics can be used to 
explore and display interesting features of the data. Communicating complex 
and multidimensional information with computational displays has been 
developed (Freeman 2000), but general graph displays often fail to 
communicate specific information about particular structures (Brandes et al. 
2003, 241). A good graphic should reveal data; induce the reader to think 
about the substance and present large amounts of information in a concise 
manner (Tufte 2001, 13). Also, some of the shortcomings of statistical 
analysis in social sciences that led to development of network analysis 
(Wasserman & Faust 1994, 7) are the same ones that have prompted 
statisticians to call for more graphic data analysis (Cohen 1994). For 
networks, graphical methods of data analysis have been developed. These 
include methods for displaying different measures of actor's centrality 
positions  in  the  networks  (Brandes  et  al.  2003)  and  various  algorithmic  
displays of data. 
The variety of individual methods is too great to provide a sensible 
summary here, as they run from analyses of small egonetworks to analyses of 
small world networks, taking the whole of internet at once (Watts 2003). The 
descriptions of the specific methods are left to the later chapters describing 
the articles and, mainly, the articles themselves. Instead, the particular 
tradition in network analysis that has had a strong impact on governance 
networks literature is discussed; the policy network tradition (Klijn 1996 for 
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a  nice  overview)   shares  many  of  the  properties  of  governance,  as  well  as  
some intellectual forefathers (Rhodes 1990).  
Research into policy networks gained popularity in the 1980s, hoping to 
explain two of the very same observations that are behind governance theory 
– that analyses focusing solely on state actors did not produce a satisfactory 
description of how policy is made, and that the policy process models 
(Brewer & DeLeon 2000) where policy-making is depicted as an orderly 
process is problematic, as there is inevitable backtracking, and policy never 
reaches a real conclusion. This led into the development of the policy 
network concept, where linkages between organizations are investigated.  
At first, simple typologies of networks in different domains of policy were 
developed (Marsh & Rhodes 1992, 251; van Waarden 1992). The use of these 
typologies was quickly deemed simplistic and atheoretical (Dowding 1995), 
and the policy network research community was not able to satisfactorily 
answer these criticisms (Dowding 2001). Academic discussions really seem 
to go in cycles: the similarities to the debate on governance theory, 
undertaken ten years later, are striking. The governance discussion seems to 
have inherited many of the complications of the policy network debate, but 
unfortunately many of the insights and answers have been forgotten. Here, 
many  of  the  analytical  instruments  used  are  derivatives  from  the  policy  
network base – most importantly the assumption that public and private 
actors  can  be  members  of  the  same network,  and  that  this  does  not  lead  to  
any assumptions about their role in the networks. 
The network analyses were completed using three social network analysis 
packages: Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar 2011), UCINET (Borgatti et al. 1999) and 
StOCNet (Boer et al. 2006). All three are packages specifically designed for 
social network data, and provide a number of methods for data handling, 
analysis and visualization. All images published were produced using Pajek, 
and the exponential random graph model was done with StOCNet.  
2.2.1 ALTERNATIVE NETWORK CONCEPTS 
 
As with governance, social network is a concept that comes with baggage: the 
uses in everyday life and research are varied, and some clarifications are in 
order. The two closest relatives to the networks in governance are the 
network society, changes in society due to increasing communication enabled 
by technology (Castells 2000), and actor-network theory (Latour 2005), a 
social theory for describing material and semiotic relations between human 
and nonhuman actors as a network. 
In the network society, politics and power, too, are manifested through 
communication. Governance networks pertain to an increased 
communication, too, but in a somewhat different manner than what is meant 
by  network  society  theses.  The  network  society  –  “characterized  by  the  
pervasiveness of communication networks in a multimodal hypertext” 
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(Castells 2007, 239) forms its power relations in the communication field. 
But this communication field is rather different from the patterns of 
governance: it refers to the internet, new mass media and so on. While there 
might be interesting associations between the two traditions, governance 
networks do not define the media of communication, and network society 
concepts are of little use here. 
On the surface, actor-network theory and social network analysis share 
many common themes; both can be said to be “strictly limited to the tracing 
of new associations and to the designing of their assemblages” (Latour 2005, 
7). Even the semiotic claim of material things – actors are what they are due 
to their network relations (Law 1999, 3) – is unproblematic for social 
network analysis.  
It is the differing definitions for network and relational concepts that 
preclude the use of network analysis methodology in actor-networks. This is 
acknowledged by both social network analysts (Breiger 2003, 29; Newig 
2010) and actor-network theorists (Latour 1997).  
In part, the difference arises from working at different levels of theory. 
Actor-network theory wants to dissect what is called social and society. It is 
not a grand theory in the traditional sense, but it is not middle range theory 
either,  as  it  does  not  aim  for  simplicity  (Geels  2007,  635).  Actor-network  
theorists are most famous and most criticised for their insistence of attaching 
actor status to non-human beings, objects, and even concepts. The debate on 
whether agency requires intentionality or simply having a bearing on 
something  else  is  irrelevant  here.  Social  network  analysis  makes  no  claims  
about what is society, or what should be considered social. It does, however, 
require a priori definition of an actor in the network of interest. This 
definition does not try to account for all the forces affecting an actor, or even 
the most important ones. It derives a single or a few networks from the 
research questions, and empirically determines if the data on these networks 
can be used to answer the questions.  
The same applies to the relations between these actors: social network 
analysis defines a small set of relations that can, at least in principle, exist 
between  all  pairs  of  actors.  Actor-network  theory  requires  heterogeneity  of  
actors  and  ties.  Social-network  analysis  requires  actors  and  ties  to  be  
homogenous  in  type,  even  if  not  in  substance.  For  example,  when  a  social  
network analyst is interest in a group of organizations, they are all 
organizations, even if they can be diverse in the institutional form or 
motivation. For an actor-network theorist, a network with just organizations 
is very uninteresting: organizations can probably be grouped together in the 





2.3.1 CASE: CITY OF HELSINKI 
 
Helsinki is the capital of Finland, with a quarter of the population and a third 
of the gross domestic product of the country distributed in the city itself and 
the surrounding metropolitan area. The Helsinki municipality itself has 580 
000 inhabitants in the municipality, with slightly more than 1 million in the 
metropolitan  area  and  1.4  million  in  the  commuter  belt  region  of  24  
municipalities. As the capital, Helsinki has always been important within 
Finland, but the salience of Helsinki in the national economic and political 
sphere has increased in the past two decades. After a deep recession in the 
early 1990s, different regions in the country have faced different economic 
growth rates, with much of the recovery concentrating in Helsinki. Around 
the same time, European Union membership for Finland meant an increase 
in international importance for Helsinki. (Haila & Le Galés 2005, 118-119.) 
Helsinki has been active in developing local environmental policies, 
demonstrating the recent trend in bottom-up policy processes, where the 
local level can be the driver, instead of national government (Gibbs & Jonas 
2000, 299). Even though the Helsinki policies have not passed without 
criticism (e.g. Jalonen 2002, 15-16 for official assessments), these factors 
make environmental decision-making in Helsinki an interesting empirical 
case for developing and testing the governance framework presented in this 
study. The next chapter describes the City of Helsinki administration and the 
policy-making institutions, followed by a description of environmental policy 
in the city.  
2.3.2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNANCE IN FINLAND 
 
Finland  is  an  example  of  the  Scandinavian  model  of  local  democracy,  with  
independent municipalities with wide-ranging tasks (John 2001, 33), party 
politics and an educated bureaucratic staff (Saarelainen 2003, 167). Cities are 
powerful: autonomy from state is dictated in law, and this includes power to 
collect  taxes,  as  well  as  provide  most  public  services.  Their  importance  has  
even grown recently, as responses to external shocks led the national 
government  to  grant  powers  to  cities.  (Haila  &  Gales  2005,  118)  The  
simultaneous internal and external shocks from an ageing population, 
urbanization and environmental issues also constitute major challenges to 
the state and major urban areas – mainly Helsinki area (von Bruun & Kirvelä 
2009).  
The main elected democratic body is the municipal council. The 
municipal councils have between 13 and 85 representatives, elected with an 
open party-list proportional system. Helsinki as the largest city has the 
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largest number of representatives. The council delegates its power to the 
municipal board and further to the municipal committees, who provide 
political oversight and direction to administrative organizations and may 
delegate other tasks as well.  The board and the committees are not directly  
elected, but are nominated by the parties, with the usual arrangement being a 
distribution of seats reflecting the distribution of seats in the council.  
Informal delegation of tasks to stakeholders and networks of public and 
private organizations and to other municipalities is usual, and has become 
more common in the recent years (Haveri & Pehk 2007, 4). Top civil servants 
are relatively independent of the council in the management of their field, 
but they are often appointed on a semi-political basis (Sandberg 1998, 5). 
Local authorities, both political and administrative, also have considerable 
leeway in dealing with national requirements and laws, by using direct 
contracts instead of the more cumbersome ordinary planning procedure 
(Haila 2009, 812).  
The processes that have raised interest in governance are, then, also 
present in Finland. Networks and governance have also attracted research 
(among others, see Nyholm & Haveri 2009; Saarelainen 2003; Haveri et al. 
2009). Haveri and Pehk (2007) provide an excellent review of the field. They 
split the network definitions used in the studies into three groups based on 
the institutional or official status of the networks.  
These all differ slightly from the definition used here that builds on social 
network analysis and graph theory: even the unofficial networks are built on 
shared  values,  for  example,  while  the  definition  here  pertains  simply  to  
organizations involved. They also apply a different criterion for self-
organization,  as  they  require  a  common  interest  for  the  network  (ibid.  27),  
while the more generic network definition does not require this.  
2.3.3 ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN HELSINKI 
 
In Helsinki, environmental policy-making involves the city council, the city 
board, the city environment centre – guided by the environment committee, 
as well as numerous other city agencies, some of the most important being 
the city planning, real estate, and public works departments. The city council 
has the official power to decide, but they delegate that power either 
permanently or on a case-by-case basis to the bodies below them. Even when 
they make the decision themselves, the policies are prepared by the city 
agencies and officials. Environmental policy-making is also affected by the 
obligations decreed by regional, national, and EU-wide laws, policies, and 
agreements. Regionally, the Helsinki Metropolitan Area Council is the most 
important actor, where the Helsinki city council elects half of the 
representatives to the decision-making body. The importance of the council 
has increased with the preoccupation over climate change, as the cities have 




More complicated and wide-ranging policy efforts are designed in 
collaborative processes involving a range of organizations. Public and private 
organizations are involved in a variety of ways with each other. These 
involvements form the main data for my analyses, and they are described in 
the following data chapter.  
The  product  of  this  network,  the  environmental  policy  of  Helsinki,  is  
defined in a range of documents and policies. Many decisions with a strong 
effect on the state of the natural environmental are permanently delegated to 
officials, made by the independent city subsidiaries, or made in the council 
via major, one-off projects, especially in traffic planning. More general are 
the so-called programme level documents. These are wide-ranging 
documents prepared in a collaborative effort by the city administration, 
based  on  a  call  to  action  by  the  political  actors.  Since  1990,  environmental  
policy has been considered important enough to mandate a specific sectoral 
programme, starting out as the Helsinki environment programme and later 
integrating sustainable development terminology to become the ecological 
sustainability programme in the latest policy. Besides these, many sectoral 
programmes directly or indirectly make environmental policy, and the 
emphasis of the city's actions has lately been on issues such as construction, 
where many other issues besides environmental ones are at play. 
Figure  3  shows  the  relations  between  a  selection  of  the  most  important  
documents defining environmental action. A more detailed list of these 
documents is in Appendix 1. The network is generated on the basis of 
similarities in issue areas that the documents handle, and the network is 
mapped by making these similarities into proximities in the graphic. The 
network of documents is based on the set of documents available in 2009, so 
it is not an exact correspondence to the networks of actors, based on data 
collected in 2005 and 2006.  
The mapping demonstrates the three branches of environmental policy in 
Helsinki: the official environmental policy programmes, the regional 
programmes, and the sectoral programmes. A visual analysis of the map 
points to some interesting features of differences between the substance and 
role of different programmes. On the vertical axis, the organizing factor 
seems to be scope, with the sustainability programmes with social, economic, 
as well as multiple environmental goals placed at the very top, and the 
policies with the narrowest focus place at the bottom. The horizontal axis 
represents sectoral focus, with programmes that integrate between sectors 
placed on the left and those that either only involve one sector or one sector 
at a time, like energy efficiency arrangrements, on the right. 
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Figure 3. The network of Helsinki environmental policy documents 
 
It highlights the difference between the 3rd environment programme and the 
other programme level documents, as well as the different role for the 
metropolitan area documents and the larger regional operations through the 
Uusimaa Programme. The 3rd programme is placed with the traditional 
nature conservation methods due to a narrower definition of the authority of 
the city. The same goes for the Uusimaa document, as it does not emphasize 
the importance of the urban structure. 
Also, the positions of the sectoral documents for energy policy and 
construction are interesting. They are grouped with the regional documents 
prepared  through  the  Helsinki  Metropolitan  Area  Cooperation  Council,  
probably reflecting the importance granted to these fields in environmental 
policy. The energy policy, for example, does not simply concern energy 
production, but also all matters affecting energy consumption, from land use 
to construction. Similarly, even though construction was only one of six 
themes singled out for further development in the ecological sustainability 
programme, the budding2 programme might end up having effects on all the 
other sectors.  
                                               
2 Only the first part of the document was public at the time of the analysis. 
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2.4   DATA 
2.4.1 DATA COLLECTION PROCESS 
 
The data collection process for the study consisted of interviews, archival 
data collection and a coding process to transform the data into a suitable 
form for network analysis. In the chapter, I will present the interviews, along 
with the network boundary definition process. In section 2.4.2. I show how a 
single non-directed, non-valued network was derived from the data. In 2.4.3., 
I discuss the coding of the background or non-network variables, and 2.4.4. 
briefly presents the resulting environmental governance network in Helsinki. 
The data collection process started with the definition and choice of 
organizations. As is usual with case studies, multiple sources of evidence 
were incorporated into the case study database (Yin 2003, 97-105). The data 
consists of interviews and documents. The data collection procedure followed 
the recommendations of Bogason and Zølner (2007, 9-16) by using publicly 
available  documents  for  first  impressions,  followed  by  interviews  that  were  
the primary source of information about network events, but that were 
complemented with more documents, including meeting minutes, policy 
stances, and environmental policies and so on.  
The first phase of the data collection was the organization of a preliminary 
list of organizations in the network. This list was based on documents related 
to  the  policy  process  concerning  the  4th Helsinki environmental policy 
programme, with the option of using snowball sampling to add more 
organizations based on the interviews. A single representative was chosen to 
represent each organization. These choices were based on documents, on job 
titles, as well as simply asking the organization for a representative on 
environmental policy matters. Structured in-depth interviews were 
conducted with the representatives. The network data was derived from these 
interviews. The following chapter describes the data collection process in 
more detail. 
Organizational network analysis has an additional ethical problem with 
consent (Borgatti & Molina 2005, 108): the interviewee can give personal 
consent, but possibly not on the behalf of the whole organization, and 
obviously cannot consent on behalf of the organizations she names during 
the interview.  In our data collection the representatives were promised 
personal anonymity, with the understanding that the organizations can 
possibly  be  identified.  While  informed  readers  will  undoubtedly  have  no  
problem  identifying  some  of  the  specific  organizations,  a  certain  degree  of  
anonymity is retained, and no list of the interviewees or the organizations 
they represent is included.  
The initial listing of organizations took the Helsinki Ecological 
Sustainability Programme and the organizations involved in the official 
working groups in charge of the policy draft, as well as all the organizations 
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that left an official comment in the open consultation process after the draft 
version was completed. This initial list had 73 organizations. The aim was to 
include all organizations involved, so the possibility of a snowball sampling 
procedure was left open. The procedure is similar to the one used in Knoke et 
al. (1996, 66-72), and corresponds to the double strategy for respondent 
choice recommended by Zølner et al. (2007, 132-133). However, only a few 
organizations were added to the sample by the snowball procedure. Thus, the 
complete sampling procedure should be considered an event-based approach 
based  on  existing  documents  (Marsden  2005,  9-10),  as  the  option  of  an  
expanding selection procedure yielded essentially the same set of 
organizations.  
Two interviewees represented two different organizations with a very 
similar background. Theoretically, the pairs of organizations could have been 
united  into  a  single  unit  for  the  purposes  of  the  analysis,  but  as  the  
interviewees held that the connections of the organizations were somewhat 
different, they were decided to be included as separate actors.  
Thus,  76  interviews  were  conducted  by  the  primary  researcher  and  a  
research assistant. The in-depth interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 
an hour and a half,  with about two thirds of  the time spent focusing on the 
questions of the communication partners and the remaining third on the 
interests, preferences, and expertise relating to environmental policy 
matters. The interviews proceeded with open questioning over the topics 
structured  in  the  interview  plan,  with  reminder  lists  for  the  interviewer  to  
bring  up,  should  the  interviewee  have  trouble  recalling  the  answers  to  the  
questions. The interview plan is in appendix 2. The answers were coded by 
the interviewer during the interview as well as recorded for further checking. 
The  interviewees  were  also  asked  to  supply  the  interviewer  with  an  annual  
report and any other documents that describe the organization and its 
activities. 
The part focusing on communication generates the bulk of network data. 
The interviewees were asked to describe all  communication that  they felt  is  
related  to  the  environmental  policy  process  of  Helsinki,  even  if  may  not  
directly concern policy-making. As there are known reliability issues with 
informant recall (Bernand et al 1981), the procedure for building the network 
data  set  requires  specific  care.  I  respond  to  these  by  a  so-called  record-
assisted recall procedure for the connections, as well as by using supporting 
archival data in combination with the interviews with a cut-off threshold for 
reports in the variety of sources for a connection to be recorded in the main 
network data. 
The  open  questions  formulation  was  supplemented  with  more  specific  
questions concerning specific organizations with related background, 
interests, or expertise. The approach combines free recall, best suited for 
finding established and strong ties, and recognition from a list, better for 
finding weaker or less frequent ties (Ferligoj & Hlebec 1999, 126-127), into a 
record-assisted recall process (Bernard et al. 1984, 507). The representatives 
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were asked to shortly describe the communication between the 
organizations, as well as the frequency of it. For the description, the 
interview question was open-ended, and generated answers ranging from 
one-word characterizations to historical narratives of the relation between 
the organizations. If the interviewee reported frequency without prompting, 
it was recorded; if not, the options from the interview plan were listed or 
shown.  
The frequency and characteristics were both recorded in the data at three 
levels. The frequency was recorded as at least weekly, at least monthly, and 
less  frequent.  Even  though  the  reliability  of  communication  frequency  
measures  has  been  estimated  to  be  low (i.e.  people  do  not  recall  how often  
they communicate very well) (Bernard et al. 1981), the use of ordinal scales of 
frequency has been found to increase reliability in identification of 
connections (i.e. partners that would not be recalled at all in a binary scheme 
are reported when prompted for low frequency) (Ferligoc & Hlebec 1999, 
126).  Thus,  prompting  about  frequency  was  used  to  help  recall,  even  if  the  
frequency measures were later transformed into a binary network data set. 
The types of communication were recorded as strictly related to the 
environmental policy programmes, or as relating to policy making in general, 
or all types of communication relating to environmental policy.   
2.4.2 NETWORK DATA CODING 
 
For all the analyses presented here, a single non-valued, non-directed 
network was used. This is in contrast to the tradition of measuring multiple 
overlapping networks or types of relations in interorganizational network 
analyses – traditionally networks of money or resource exchange, 
information sharing, and moral support (Galaskiewicz 1979).  
The  choice  to  focus  on  a  single,  general  measure  of  communication  ties  
was partly from research design and partly from necessities to clean up the 
data. Material and immaterial resource exchange and trust issues were 
deliberately left out of the data. For immaterial resources, such as policy 
position and political support exchange, governance theory stipulates open 
ended policy problems and an open ended policy structure. Policy processes 
in governance are not easily described as explicit bargaining situations, 
where organizations trade positions. It is a process of knowledge integration, 
or solving problems together (Hukkinen 2008).  
Exchange models do not easily explain how the organizations choose 
something  that  was  not  on  the  original  agenda  or  is  not  a  compromise  
between the earlier positions. Exchange models also need to differentiate 
between resources of public and private organizations and conceptualize 
policy as exchanges between public and private sets of actors (Pappi & 
Henning 1998, 558), against the intent of governance models. 
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Measurements of trust and material resources were left out due to 
complications in measuring. Material resources for the set of organizations 
are too heterogenous and interdependent to be captured for a single 
organization, and even less so for exchange between organizations. 
Evidently, the budgets and resources of municipal departments depend on 
the city council, but even then the city is responsible for certain services by 
law and the degree to which resources are controlled by the city council is not 
evident. Private organizations include for-profits and non-profits with 
different scales of activity – national, local, or even global, and assigning a 
proportion of the resources as relevant to Helsinki is complicated.  
Interorganizational trust and trustworthiness are important facilitators 
for  cooperation,  but  no  widely  agreed  method  for  measuring  them  is  
available (Seppänen et al. 2007). For policy networks, trust can even be seen 
as a constitutive factor (Börzel 1997, 9). Here, direct inquiries about trust 
were left out of the interviews as they could have been too sensitive. 
Especially for intergovernmental relations, the assumption was that the 
respondents would feel uncomfortable reporting problems of trust. For 
governance networks, trust would possibly be analysed from longitudinal 
network data, with stabilized collaboration patterns representing 
institutionalized trust. The cross-sectional data available here does not allow 
for such developments. 
Still,  the  interviews  were  designed  to  incorporate  any  information  
exchange or communication patterns with open-ended questioning. The 
organizations  gave  rich  descriptions  of  their  collaborations,  and  it  would  
have been possible to conceptualize and code different types of relations from 
this information. But upon coding, the strongest emerging pattern was 
overlap in communication – the interviewees usually listed either multiple 
types of relations they had with partners, or none. The choice to use these as 
a single measure – does a pair of actors engage in direct communication? – 
was partly done for convenience, and alternatives do exist. 
Network measurements from the interviews were supplemented by 
archival data. Official minutia and other documents from the policy process 
(the  ones  used  are  listed  in  Appendix  1)  as  well  as  material  handed  to  the  
interviewer at the interview were used to confirm the more ambiguous 
network connections.  
The documents supplied by the organizational representatives included 
annual reports as well as environmental reports and corporate responsibility 
documents. The events and partnerships described in these documents were 
used to confirm network links that one of the organizations reported but 
another did not. 
Under-reporting of ties to peripheral organizations by the most central 
ones is a potential problem for a policy network, where the central actors 
maintain a high number of connections and might forget the less essential 
ties.  To  deal  with  this  issue,  a  threshold  model  for  the  ties  for  the  main  
network was adopted: each tie can be mentioned in up to three 
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measurements, twice in the interviews at the organizations and once in the 
documents. All ties that are mentioned in at least two of these sources were 
included in the final data set.  
2.4.3 BACKGROUND DATA CODING 
 
Along  the  network  questions,  background,  interest,  and  expertise  questions  
were asked. These questions were open-ended, but were used to derive 
simple  numerical  variables  in  a  researcher-driven  coding  process.  It  was  
often necessary to combine the interview responses to the archival 
documents. This builds on the tradition of coding policy positions based on 
text (see Laver & Garry 2000), and supplements direct questions when 
possible. Traditional background variables were mostly derived from the 
documents,  and  no  questions  concerning  the  size  of  staff  of  budget,  for  
example, were included in the interviews. Type of organization is the main 
variable  of  interest  here,  given  the  importance  given  to  the  private-public  -
distinction in governance literature. These, too, were included based on prior 
knowledge. The interview did include a short section on how environmental 
matters were placed in the official organization chart.  
The  questions  on  interests  or  preferences  focused  on  what  the  
organization  was  hoping  to  achieve  in  and  through  Helsinki  environmental  
policy, and why. The motivations for involvement in environmental policy-
making included justifications from ideological goals to commercial interests, 
and from aiming to alter or better the everyday surroundings in the city or in 
the neighbourhood, to requirement to be involved in the organizational 
mandate for administrative organizations. These goals were almost perfectly 
in  sync  with  organization  type,  and  the  questions  on  general  ideology  
remained fairly superficial, without going into in-depth justifications. 
The goal with the preference variables was to estimate the connections 
between them, the network structure and the chosen policy. But there are 
two problems associated with this task: organizational preferences are hard 
to measure and conceptualize, and the timing of the data collection. As the 
data collection happened after the events had concluded, there were issues 
with fishing out the original preferences. Also, preference – a psychic state – 
is problematic to attach to organizations, even if observing organizations 
acting is deemed feasible (Coleman 1990, 527). Thus, when possible, I relied 
on the revealed preference over the stated preference when possible. 
For the analysis in article I, this meant that when an official comment was 
given in the drafting procedure, the statements therein where recorded as the 
organization’s preferences, and the interview questions were used otherwise. 
The interview questions did not specifically ask for each specific policy 
possibility, but wider themes corresponding to the sub-objectives in the 
Action Plan for Sustainability. The level of specificity in defining the interest 
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area varied, leaving an important role for the coding to the researcher. For 
the most part, the coding was a straightforward task. 
The interest areas overlap with the issue expertise areas, but not 
completely.  The  expertise  questions  mapped  the  knowledge  held  by  the  
organization,  by  issue  area  as  well  as  by  perceived  base  of  knowledge.  The  
importance of local ecological knowledge in planning has been emphasized 
(Yli-Pelkonen & Kohl 2005, 3). Any environmental policy and policy aimed at 
sustainable development in particular has to account for the variety of 
sources of information, ranging from the various disciplines of science to 
local, tacit knowledge.  
The  interviewees  were  thus  encouraged  to  bring  up  fields  of  knowledge  
where they felt they had accumulated expertise, whether it was backed by 
formal institutional status or not. Using a simple, self-reported expertise 
measure with a single informant per organization provides a fairly crude 
measure of expertise. As the knowledge resources are distributed in the 
organization throughout the many departments and individuals who make 
up the organization, a proper knowledge measurement would require 
surveying multiple informants for a pre-established set of knowledge 
resources  held  (King  &  Zeithaml,  764-768).  As  the  aim  here  was  not  
comparing expertise resources between the organizations, building a 
combined measure from single-informant interview and archival data was 
deemed sufficient. 
For example, if the goal was to see which of the organizations held the 
most knowledge in ecological construction, and how that affected policy, a 
more fine-grained alternative would have been required. Here, we are 
comfortable with measuring which organizations have any expertise in the 
area,  and  comparing  over  issue  areas.  The  measure  is  useful  for  looking  at  
the networking process between holders of expertise knowledge in multiple 
areas – to see how the holders of ecological construction expertise and traffic 
planning expertise are connected to others, who may only have a single base 
of knowledge. I have used two alternative coding schemes from the data, with 
either 10 or 15 categories, in Table 1. In retrospect, the fifteen-point scale is 
better.  
To support the organizational data and link the network with the results, 
policy  outcome  measures  were  also  included  in  the  data  set.  Two  different  
ways of analysing the outputs or final policies were also included in the data. 
First, simply taking the number of policy instruments generated was used to 
compare policy outputs in different areas. While this measure in no way 
accounts for the differences in efficiency, budget and real world results, it is a 
useful measure for comparison of network activity: a more efficient network 
probably (on average) generates more policy measures, and vice versa. As the 
effectiveness of policy measures is subjective and complex, and this study 
does not aim to be an evaluation of policies, a very rough measure of policy 
success was used. The policies were checked by the researcher and any with 
significant overlap were combined. The number of policies should work as a 
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reasonable proxy for policy generation success, as the scope of the policies 
was fairly similar over issue areas. For example, if the budgets granted to 
different  policies  were  very  different,  this  might  point  at  a  difference  in  
scope; this was not the case for the data used.  
Table 1. Expertise areas coding schemes used 
 
Ten categories coding 
(article I) 
Fifteen categories coding (article III) 
Climate change and greenhouse 
gas reductions 
 
Climate change                + Greenhouse gas 
emission reductions 
Nature conservation and 
biodiversity 
 
Nature conservation       + Biodiversity 
Environmental education and 
consciousness 
Environmental education 
in city organization         +  
Environmental 





Local environmental knowledge 
 
 












Energy use                        + Energy production 
Baltic Sea protection 
 
Baltic Sea protection 
Ecological construction Ecological construction 
 
Second,  a  possible  approach  is  to  take  a  possible  set  of  options  or  a  policy  
space and compare it to observed outcomes. But traditionally, the policy 
space is usually conceptualized on a left-right –continuum (Laver 2001, 3-4), 
and governance implies a more complicated, open policy space. I have taken 
the input fed into the policy process as the starting point, and compared that 
to outcomes (article I). The input was the Action Plan for Sustainability, and 
the output the Ecological Sustainability Program. They are not exact matches 
in scope and focus, but again, when the idea was to do simple comparisons 
between different network effects, the measure should be feasible. The 
measure presented builds the argument that governance can be used to 
explain policy choice beyond simple government. The government set the 
network  off  with  an  input  document,  and  it  is  fair  to  assume it  wanted  the  
Theory, Method, and Data 
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output to correspond to the input.. Another way to look at it was the median 
voter model – for each measure, the median voter’s preference for presence 
or absence of policy goals was calculated. These were compared to network 
models, where indices of network positions were included. 
2.4.4 THE CITY OF HELSINKI ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 
NETWORK 
 
The network, interest and expertise together with policy output measures 
constitute the main data set of the study. The materials collected include 
considerably more information, plenty of which was not used in this main 
data. The data collection process is not the most efficient, but due to the 
inherent difficulties in using informants in network data collection 
(Bondonio 1998, 301-302), an over-intensive data collection is required. 
Also, the data that is not included in the main data set used for the modelling 
of governance processes is not discarded, but serves as an extensive source of 
background materials in making and reporting the analyses. 
In the network, many communication patterns emerge, depending on the 
scope used.  Individual organizations vary greatly in the number of 
communication links they held, but a more detailed analysis (article I) 
showed that the opportunities to pass information anywhere in the network 
and opportunities to act as a middleman between organizations were more 
equally distributed.  As expected, organizations within specific sectors cluster 
their communications, but there are interesting differences between the issue 
areas and their degree of clustering – these subnetworks and subnetwork 
structures are analyzed in article II.  
Figure 4 summarizes the Helsinki environmental policy network. The 
figure was generated by applying a graph drawing algorithm that treats 
connections as forces bringing organizations closer together and places them 
in the graph in a manner that minimizes stress – or lack of correspondence to 
the  actual  ties.   The  graph  was  further  clarified  by  conditioning  the  
placement on three concentric circles for central, semi-peripheral and 
peripheral organizations. For a detailed description of this procedure, see de 
Nooy et al. 2005, 31-33. 
The network is fairly well-connected, with a density (the proportion of ties 
to the theoretical maximum) of 0.207, or 20.7% of possible ties present. The 
image displays all the organizations in the network on three concentric 
circles, according to centrality, and highlights four groups: the core of central 
administration and the most environmentally oriented city agencies, 
environmental NGOs and city subsidiaries, local NGOs and interest groups 
and the less connected administrative actors.  
The image points to the conclusions made in article II – while central 
government still holds the most connected positions, they are not privileged 
to work as intermediaries between other actors, nor are they privileged with 
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other actors being more dependent on them to get messages into the 
network. As discussed in section 2.1.2., governance does not necessarily 
mean that government has lost all power – just that a more nuanced analysis 
of policy making in the complex settings should be developed. 
 







3.1   RESULTS OF THE NETWORK ANALYSES 
 
In this chapter, a summary of the results from the analyses is provided, and 
the results are discussed in light of the governance framework laid out above. 
The research took place for the most part between 2005 and 2009, with data 
collection in 2005.  The analyses in the articles should be viewed as tools in 
building the framework, and not a proper application of it. Thus, the 
presentation of the articles does not follow the order of governance 
mechanisms they analyse, but rather the chronological order of writing and 
publishing. Figure 5 places the analyses into the framework. The articles do 
cover  all  of  the  mechanisms,  but  not  in  a  chronological  order,  nor  do  they  




Figure 5. The relation of the articles to the governance framework 
 
The first article connects policy network structures with the policy outcomes. 
Also, it establishes the links between networks, as the concept is used in 
social network analysis and this study, and governance writings. The second 
article elaborates on network structures at different scales, while still linking 
them to  the  policy  choices  made.  The  third  article  is  mostly  focused  on  the  
process of network building. In it, I analyze the emerging patterns by 
modelling the observed network structure in light of network tendencies and 





3.2   THE NETWORK CONCEPT, AUTONOMY 
 AND POLICY DECISIONS 
 
Article  I  develops  the  concepts  of  network  and  governance  and  the  
interaction of the two. The article starts from the abstract concepts as they 
often are used in governance literature, and develops them to a logical 
conclusion. A meaningful definition of governance networks requires 
reference  to  patterns  in  the  network  structures.  The  focus  of  governance  
analysts – at least at the time of writing – was often on collaborative efforts 
named networks by the responsible governing body, with varying numbers of 
organizations involved, but the communication assumed to be open to all. In 
reality, no communication process ever gives all members – if there are three 
or more – exactly the same communication opportunities, and the 
governance model should reflect that. Further, the article discusses the 
autonomy of the network partners in communication choices, a concept more 
elaborated on in the third article.  
The article also gives an initial exploration into the link between policy 
outcomes  and  network  structures.  Here,  a  shortlist  of  possible  policies  was  
taken as a starting point, and different models were used for producing post 
hoc predictions for final policy inclusion. The article works in the second 
phase of the governance framework. The network structure is taken as 
already established, and then structures within the network are compared to 
policy outcomes on the level of the whole network and the complete policy.  
The biggest difference between the first article and the final framework 
lies in the policy decision modelling: the weakness is the assumption of a 
closed  policy  space,  whereas  the  theory  of  governance  derives  much  of  its  
theoretical strength from the definition of policy as multidimensional and 
open. Of course, any research has to make simplifying assumptions, and this 
one  was  very  convenient  –  an  exogenous  policy  space  was  given,  as  a  prior  
process shortlisted policies. A more elegant policy space assumption would 
give the framework more explanatory power. 
 
3.3   NETWORK STRUCTURE AND  
 POLICY DECISIONS 
 
The second article focuses on exploration of network structures. The 
governance  network  structure  is  explored  with  three  sets  of  measures:  
centrality measures, structural holes, and subgroup cores. Centrality 
measures describe the connectedness of the organizations, defined slightly 
differently to reveal different dimensions in influence that occur when the 
decision is complex. The network described by these measures appears to be 
Results 
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well-connected on the whole. Administrative organizations and city 
subsidiaries have the widest range of connections, followed by 
representatives of the central political organizations, with all private actor 
groups keeping fewer connections with a more sectoral focus.  
Structural  holes  are  network  positions  allowing  one  organization  to  
control the network flow between two other organizations. An actor benefits 
if two of their communication partners can not directly communicate and 
have to rely on the actor to pass information. The results of the structural 
hole  analysis  by  organization  type  are  similar  to  the  results  from  the  
centrality analysis: the public organizations are less constrained than private 
organizations.  The network cores by organization type were also similar.  
The structural hole and subgroup analyses were also done over policy 
issue areas. This part of the analysis connects the structures to the policy 
decisions by comparing the structures with a measure of policy productivity. 
Over six policy issue areas, the amount of policy instruments produced in the 
networks was compared to average structural constraint in the area 
subnetwork and the largest cores or cohesive groups in the area subnetwork. 
Higher  network  constraint  was  connected  to  productivity,  as  were  dense  
cores of area communication network.  
Together, the results imply that dense and well-connected local networks, 
combined with a sparse global structure where information brokerage 
dominates, are most efficient at delivering policy.  The analysis is similar to 
the one in the first article, but with different definitions for network 
structures and policy options. The first article looks at the policy possibilities 
as  a  closed  set,  while  here  the  amount  of  policy  produced  is  the  dependent  
variable, and could attain any values. The article focuses on the second part 
of the governance process, the transformation from network into policy 
output.  The  fourth  mechanism  in  the  framework,  network  structure  effects  
on individual behaviour, is well-established. The connection of structures 
and  policies  is  reasonable  too,  even  if  it  lacks  a  founded  link  to  individual  
actions. 
The analyses in the article differ from the governance framework in 
placing more interest on the influence of various types of organizations. This 
was a response to the often repeated statement about governance 
overestimating private influence: the idea was to demonstrate a governance 
network where public and private actors co-exist, and anybody could in 
theory be the central actor. However, empirically the public actors are more 
connected. The generalizability and importance of this is doubtful. Probably 
in a different context, private actors are more central and have more 
brokering opportunities. But doing the analyses by organization is not easily 
connected to the final policy: power is simply too evasive to catch, and policy 




3.4   MODELLING THE  GOVERNANCE  
 NETWORK BUILDING PROCESS 
 
The third article sets out to explore the mechanisms of network building. The 
method of exponential random graph modelling allows the comparison of the 
importance of various motivations for establishing communication links. 
These can be network structures themselves, or they can be actor attributes. 
The analysis uses a set of network structures that summarizes all possible 
local structures, and complements these with three actor attributes: 
expertise, type of organization, and similarity of type of organization (i.e. are 
public organization more likely to communicate with other public 
organizations, and private organizations with private organizations).  
The model results report a strong preference for subgroup building, along 
with a medium one for expertise, and weak effects for type of organization 
and type similarity. Controlling for other effects, the government actually 
appeared slightly less attractive as a communication partner than private 
organizations. The figure of the networking process that emerges from the 
model  is  one  where  organizations  initiate  the  network  building  to  
organizations of the same type that hold information. Dynamically, these 
result in subgroup structures that are more important in the establishment of 
later links.  
As the article is chronologically the last one, it most clearly reflects the 
framework.  The  model  covers  the  first  three  mechanisms,  or  how  the  
network results from the initial policy needs. The link to individual actions is 
established, and there are no real differences between the model and the 
framework.  
3.5   SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The empirical data was of considerable importance in the building of the 
framework,  and  this  has  inevitably  contributed  to  the  shape  of  the  model.  
This goes against the traditional suggestions in statistical research, but 
should not compromise the mechanism-based model. The mechanisms were 
based on literature and theoretical thought, and the empirical application 
developed mainly via learning from the data.  
Also, the model and the mechanisms were not uniformly applicable and 
satisfactory even in this single case. The first phase of the framework worked 
well.  The  network  building  based  on  expertise  was  observed,  and  statistical  
estimates  of  the  process  were  obtained.  A  longitudinal  data  set  would  




 For a single network observation, the exponential random graph 
approach is probably the best way to distinguish between the different 
motivations  in  link  building.  A  qualitative  assessment  would  be  
overwhelmingly strenuous, and the data might be even less reliable than the 
simple numerical data: the interviewees are not necessarily able to 
differentiate between the relative importance of the motivations they have, 
and the reporting might focus solely on the most important one. 
The  second phase  of  the  framework  is  more  complicated.  There  are  two  
issues: first, the individual communication actions are very hard to observe, 
while in principle observable. Second, the policy outcomes are easy to 
measure, but the process of policy generation in the network is not. The most 
likely  solution  would  be  a  simulation  modelling  approach,  making  
assumptions about actor behaviour and comparing different 
parameterisations to actual policy results. Again, this does not really solve 
the problem of open policy space: the model has to start with some initial set 





4.1 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The  aim  of  this  work  was  to  develop  a  research  framework  for  governance  
analysis, along with an empirical application of such a framework. Empirical 
study  and  theoretical  work  were  interlinked  throughout  the  process.  The  
framework is based on existing literature and theoretical thinking, but the 
empirical material was used to strengthen the link between theory, 
methodology, and empirical results. The process started with the initial 
theoretical work leading into data collection, which in turn led to theory 
refining.    
The central theoretical argument of this work is that governance 
terminology  opens  up  new  avenues  of  analysis,  if  it  is  not  regarded  as  the  
opposite of government. Accounts of historical change are quite weak and 
easily challenged, since they work with ideal models of both government and 
governance that never existed, leading to classifications of old and new 
governing styles that have little analytical value (Treib et al. 2007, 2). 
Governance analysis currently works with weak assumptions about policy 
preference by type of actor – i.e. private actors want soft, voluntary 
instruments (Hysing 2009, 651; Jordan et al. 2005, 481-483). While this 
might often be true, it has no direct connection to the theory of governance, 
and in some cases the opposite may hold: a government-granted monopoly is 
surely the best thing for a private company, for example (Hillman & Katz 
1984, 104). The role of the state is complex, and it is continuously changing 
in  many  directions,  as  Hysing  (2009,  665)  concludes.  This  is  exactly  where  
governance theory steps in. To analyse the complexity of events and 
communication patterns, we need good tools– and this is what governance 
theory provides. Governance can and should cover the whole range of 
institutions and relationships in the process of governance (Pierre & Peters 
2000, 1). 
In this way, the network theory of governance suggests an empirical 
toolbox  for  analysing  the  policy-making  processes.  I  have  built  on  the  
network concepts and the literature on policy networks and recent 
developments in social network analysis methods and software. The analysis 
has been exploratory, even if driven by theory. My approach has been to look 
at  the  different  aspects  of  the  theory  and  try  to  tease  out  empirical  support  
for them in the data. Formulating the governance statements into empirical, 
testable  hypotheses  is  quite  complicated  –  and  doing  it  did  make  me  
understand why certain critics have felt governance is anything and 
everything.  Still, network analysis provided tools to dissect governance 
processes  in  ways  that  are  uncommon  in  the  current  literature  and  do  not  




I  have  mostly  remained  quiet  on  the  implications  for  network  
management. Much interest has been given to the possibilities of the state or 
the  central  government  to  build  and  manage  governance  networks  (Rhodes  
2007, 1256). There are three main instruments in managing governance 
networks: intervening in or building of network relations, consensus building 
and problem solving (Kickert & Koppenjan 1997, 45). These roles are 
important,  and  the  state  will  often  work  as  the  initiator  of  the  network,  as  
they did in the Helsinki environmental policy process. Still, insufficient 
resources and knowledge force any actor to open itself to the networking 
process – efficient network management would require much of the same 
skills as efficient policy-making itself. Obviously, an alert reader might be 
able to specify situations where using insights from this theoretical work can 
help  them  to  act  in  the  network,  but,  by  and  large,  there  are  few  if  any  
conclusions I can give to a policy-maker. 
 
4.2 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Hopefully, this research will be able to motivate others to pursue similar 
questions in a similar vein. Even popular jargon, such as governance, can be 
fruitful for research, if subjected to rigorous thinking and hairsplitting 
attention to detail.  
The next step would be to start a straightforward theory confirmation 
process,  where  the  framework  is  settled  before  data  is  collected,  and  the  
goodness of fit in application directly tests for goodness of fit in theory. This 
ideal research process is rarely possible in social sciences, but the next step 
here would an application of the framework, holding the general framework 
constant, but allowing for different foci depending on context. The best two 
solutions would be longitudinal data and a stronger connection to the theory 
of adaptive systems through socio-ecological systems. 
Data sets on the evolution of governance networks and policies over time 
would be a wonderful tool. The link between policy problems, network 
establishment, policy process, and policy outcome could be dissected in 
detail. Longitudinal data would enable the evaluation of the claims of 
governance  as  historical  change.  Even  in  this  work,  where  I  argue  that  this  
change is not a necessary part of governance, I have often referred to the 
complexity of policy issues. Network time-series would link network 
boundaries  and  structures  to  the  problems  in  an  analytical  manner.  For  
example, the implicit use of seemingly more private policy instruments as a 
proxy for governance could be broken down for analysis.   
The next step forward would be to develop a more systematic approach to 
the framework. If the micro-macro –conceptualization outlined here were 
maintained, each step should probably receive a dedicated method, with 
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explicated criteria for evaluating the analyses and running comparisons. 
Disappointingly, the limitations of the policy networks tradition have led to 
the discarding of the methodology kit of social network analysis, and many of 
the recent developments available have not been used for governance 
analyses. For example, the evolution of networks over time can now be 
estimated and analyzed. 
Deeper integration of the network governance framework with the socio-
ecological systems perspective would benefit both: links to the material limits 
and  the  real-life  issues  within  governace  would  be  clearer,  and  the  
integration could help to define the policy problem more clearly. The socio-
ecological systems framework would benefit from a more detailed 
description of the political system. 
The complexity of patterns in governance communication is great, and 
this research is but a feeble attempt at understanding it. Hopefully, my work 
can serve as one step in the ladder leading towards a better understanding.  
I will leave the reader with a quote that does a wonderful summary of the 
arguments presented here. I have argued that governance is about self-
organizing  networks,  and  that  the  roles  of  public  and  private  actors  are  
complicated, and cannot be explained without reference to their network 
positions. Network governance does not mean there is no government, just 
that  a  clear  hierarchy  does  not  exist.  The  quote  comes  from  Haveri  et  al.  
(2009) and is from an interview with a Norwegian local government 
manager. Faced with the task of managing governance networks, the 
exasperated manager laments: 
 
“Oh my God ... this runs itself” 
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APPENDIX 1: THE MAIN CITY OF HELSINKI 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DOCUMENTS 
All online documents accessed September 2009. The English name is the 
translation used in this text. All documents in Finnish, some also available in 
Swedish or English. First six were used as reference points in the interviews. 
 
Environmental Policy Programme 1990-1994. Helsingin kaupungin 
ympäristönsuojeluohjelma 1990-94. Seurantaraportti. Helsingin 
kaupungin ympäristökeskuksen monisteita 2/1991. 
 
Environmental Policy Programme 1994-1998. Helsingin kaupungin 
ympäristönsuojelun tavoite- ja toimenpideohjelma vuosille 1994 – 1998. 
Helsingin kaupungin ympäristökeskuksen julkaisuja 3/1994. 
 
Environmental Policy Programme 1999-2002. Helsingin kaupungin 






Helsinki Sustainable Development Programme 2002-2005. Helsingin 




Local Agenda 21 -idea kit. Ideapakki. Paikallisagenda 21-projekti. Helsingin 




Sustainable Development Indicators. Helsingin kestävän kehityksen 




Helsinki’s Ecological Sustainability Programme 2005-2008. Helsingin 
ekologisen kestävyyden ohjelma. Ympäristönsuojelun painopisteet 





Climate Strategy for Helsinki Metropolitan Area 2030.  Pääkaupunkiseudun 






Helsinki Metropolitan Area Vision 2025. Pääkaupunkiseudun 




Helsinki Metropolitan Area Transport System Plan. Pääkaupunkiseudun 
liikennejärjestelmäsuunnitelma (PLJ). YTV. 
http://www.ytv.fi/FIN/seutu_tulevaisuudessa/hlj/plj2007/etusivu.htm 
 
Guidelines for Energy Policy in Helsinki. Helsingin kaupungin 






Energy Efficiency Agreements. Kauppa- ja teollisuusministeriön ja Helsingin 





Helsinki Ecological Construction Programme. Helsingin ekologisesti 





Helsinki's air protection action plan. Helsingin kaupungin ilmansuojelun 




Helsinki noise protection action plan. Helsingin kaupungin meluntorjunnan 





Development of environmentally friendly urban transport. 
Ympäristöystävällisen kaupunkiliikenteen kehittäminen Helsingissä. 
Helsingin kaupungin liikennelaitos. D: 9/2007. 
 
Helsinki Nature Conservation Plan. Helsingin luonnonsuojeluohjelma 2008-







Helsinki Biodiversity Action Plan. Helsingin luonnon monimuotoisuuden 
turvaaminen. Toimintasuunnitelma 2008-2017. 
http://www.hel2.fi/ymk/Lumo/Lumo_toimintaohjelma.pdf 
 
Helsinki Baltic Sea Action Plan. Helsingin ja Turun kaupunkien toimet 
Itämeren tilan parantamiseksi - haaste muille toimijoille. 
http://www.itamerihaaste.net/index.php/itmh:plan. 
 





Uusimaa Regional Environment Programme. Uudenmaan ympäristöohjelma 






APPENDIX 2: SUMMARY OF THE INTERVIEW 
PLAN 
Before the interview, some organization-specific information was prepared to 
support the interview and help with recall processes. These included basic 
details, the reasoning for inclusion in the list, and any communication links 
and experience areas that were evident in the documents used to prepare the 
interview.  These  were  used  as  additional  help  in  questioning  –  i.e.  if  two  
organizations were known to communicate, this was asked directly instead of 
showing  the  generic  list.  If  no  information  was  available,  the  whole  list  of  
organizations was used. 
 
Background information 
- Describe your position in the organization 
- Describe the organizational structure and position of 
environmental issues in it 
- If you wish, give archival materials to support the interview 
 
Network questions 
- List any communication you have had with other 
organizations in the environmental field 
o describe the fora used 
o describe the reasons for communication 
o describe the patterns of communication 
o describe the extent of communication  
o describe the frequency of communication  
- [show list of organizations] Add and describe any additional 
communication relations with any of following 
 
Participation into policy-making 
- List and describe any non-direct forms of participation into 
environmental policy-making 
- For example: 
o official statements 
o participation in large scale meetings 
o participation in committees 









Organizational goals related to environmental policy in Helsinki 
- List specific goals related to environmental policy  
- If necessary, prompt with list 1: 
o Climate change issues 
o Nature conservation and biodiversity issues 
o Energy use issues 
o Construction and planning issues 
o Consumption issues    
o Traffic issues 
o Local issues 
 
 
Importance of environmental issues 
- Evaluate the importance of environmental policy issue areas 
for organization 
- If necessary, prompt from list 1 
 
Expertise 
- Estimate the expertise within your organization over the 
issue areas 
- If necessary, prompt from list 1 
- Estimate the importance and familiarity with a selection of 
Helsinki environmental policy documents 
- If necessary, prompt with list: 
Environmental Policy Programme 1994-1998.  
Environmental Policy Programme 1999-2002.  
Local Agenda 21 -idea kit.  
Sustainable Development Programme 2002-
2005.  
 
